Committee: General Assembly 1st Committee

Issue: The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

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Position: Co-Chair

Dear delegates,

It is a great pleasure to welcome you all in Disarmament and International Security Committee in this years' CS-MUN. My name is Konstantina Chronopoulou and I will be serving as your co-chair in what I hope to be an amazing conference. I am a 17 year old student of Pierce-College and I am a senior, so this will be one of my last conferences.

This will be my first time chairing and my 2nd time in GA1 in general. I have participated in 3 conferences so far and I am looking forward to be having a great 4th one in our committee. The topics discussed in GA1 this year appear to be very interesting and I encourage you all to do your best with your research in order to have a very fruitful debate. I suggest that you don't limit your research only to the study guide, but that you conduct your own research to form a more strong, solid and well-rounded resolution. Make sure that you check the sources that I mention at the end so as to collect all the extra information that you need, but also ensure that you're aware of your country's policy and that you apply it to the solutions you will propose.

If you have any questions regarding the study guide or the topic in general or need any help throughout or after your research, feel free to contact me anytime via my e-mail (konstantinaachronopoulou@gmail.com). Finally, I hope you all do your best researching and I'm looking forward to seeing you in the conference.

TOPIC INTRODUCTION

The extended use of ballistic missiles in various conflicts and the need to regulate the ones capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, created an urgent demand for adapting to an international regime that would prevent their proliferation, deter their use and protect any possible targets. So was the HCOC (Hague Code of Conduct) signed in 2002 and it is the only multilateral transparency and confidence building instrument concerning the spread of ballistic missiles. Since the signing and entering into force of the politically-binding HCOC in November 2002 in The Hague (Netherlands) the number of signatories has increased from 93 to 138.

DEFINITION OF KEY-TERMS

Ballistic Missile

A missile that follows a ballistic trajectory with the objective of delivering one or more warheads to a predetermined target. A ballistic missile is only guided during relatively brief periods of and most of its trajectory is unpowered and governed by gravity and air resistance if in the atmosphere.

Missile Proliferation

The multiplication of ballistic missiles so that they can have multiple targets and cause more destruction

Anti-ballistic Missile/Missile Defence

A system, weapon, or technology involved in the detection, tracking, interception, and destruction of attacking missiles, originally used as a defense against ICBMs. The system has been in the making since the 1990's and it was first tested in 2006. It only operates in fife countries: India, USA, Russia, Israel and China.

Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)

A guided ballistic missile, primarily designed for nuclear weapons delivery, suitable for use only against the largest targets, such as cities. Conventional, chemical, and biological weapons can also be delivered with varying effectiveness, but have never been deployed on ICBMs. They allow a single missile to carry several warheads, each of which can strike a different target.



Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM)

A ballistic missile capable of carrying nuclear weapons. In potential regional conflicts, these missiles are more likely to be used because of the short distances between some countries (they reach up to 1,000 km) and their relative low cost and ease of configuration.

Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM):

A ballistic missile with medium range, which includes any ballistic missile with a range up to 3,500 km.

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)/Long-Range Ballistic Missile (LRBM)

a ballistic missile with a range of 3,000–5,500 km, between a MRBM and an ICBM.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

- Any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, including the following: a bomb; grenade; rocket having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than four ounces; missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce; mine; or device similar to any of the previously described devices;
- Any weapons that is designed or intend to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors;
- Any weapon involving a disease organism;
- Any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.

PAST UN RESOLUTIONS AND ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM

The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC):

An agreement signed in 2002 by 93 countries and aims the management of ballistic missiles, especially the ones that carry arms of mass destruction in order to eliminate their use. The Code does not call for the destruction of any missiles, but is simply an agreement between States on how they should “conduct” their trade in missiles. All 138 members have to provide pre-launch notifications (PLNs) on ballistic missile and space-launch vehicle launches (SLVs) and test flights. Subscribing States also commit themselves to submit an annual declaration (AD) of their country’s policies on ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles. Although subscribing countries have agreed to adhere to the agreement, the code is not a treaty, it is not legally binding, and it contains no formal consequences for noncompliance. Several countries that are considered proliferation risks, such as North Korea, Syria, Iran, and Pakistan, did not sign the code. These states refusing to sign on the grounds of arguing that transparency measures should be

voluntary, believing that the code is vague in making a proper distinction between ballistic missile development and space-launch vehicles or for a variety of other reasons.

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT)

A treaty between USA and USSR signed in 1972 regarding the elimination of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems used in defending areas against ballistic missile-delivered nuclear weapons. Each party was limited to two ABM complexes, each of which was to be limited to 100 anti-ballistic missiles.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

A regime established in April 1987, by the G7 countries that eliminates the spread of unmanned delivery systems for nuclear weapons, especially delivery systems that could carry a payload of 500 kg for a distance of 300 km. It also includes since 1992 the nonproliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for all weapons of mass destruction.

UN Resolution 59/91

A GA resolution, which passed on December 17th, 2004 with 161 votes in favour and only two against (Iran, Egypt) and welcomed the adoption of The Hague code, acknowledged the number of the members (117 then) and urged all states to join the code.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

In 1987 the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established in order to prevent the spread of missiles and missile technology. It was supposed to help reducing the global missile proliferation threat; however it significantly failed to prevent the development of missile programs in India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel. It was clear that certain corrections had to be done.

In order to build a ballistic missile defense system, the establishment of a Global Control System for the Nonproliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology (GCS) was proposed by Russia in 1999. The MTCR then developed a code named International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICoC), used to support and complete the MTCR, but not to replace it in anyway. The code addresses the huge lack of formal international prohibition against developing, acquiring, or selling ballistic missiles in the nonproliferation regime. Even though the MTCR seeks to restrict proliferation of missiles, similarly to ICoC, it only does so through export controls and has very few members (33).

In 2002 in Helsinki, MTCR partners issued a draft International Code of Conduct, under which subscribing states would commit themselves to exercising maximum possible restraint in the development, testing, and deployment of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The draft Code offers all countries outside the

MTCR an opportunity to engage in a broader common effort to agree on an internationally binding Code of Conduct. The code has a much larger membership and, unlike the MTCR, calls on subscribing states to restraint their own missile programs and to submit the pre-mentioned annual declaration regarding their ballistic missile activities. It was later renamed to Hague Code of Conduct.

Since the HCoC came to existence in November 2002, annual Regular Meetings of Subscribing States to the HCOC are held in Vienna and now Austria is serving as the Immediate Central Contact (Executive Secretariat).

Ballistic Missiles during Cold war

In the immediate post-war era, the US and USSR both started rocket research programs based on the German wartime designs. The USSR was primarily focused on missiles able to attack European targets. In 1953, USSR started the development of an ICBM (named R-7) able to deliver newly developed hydrogen bombs. The first launch took place in 1957 and led to an unintended crash nearby. The first successful test followed and the R-7 flew over 6,000 km becoming the world's first ICBM.

An SM-65 Atlas, the first US ICBM, first launched in 1957

The U.S. initiated ICBM research in 1946. The American “Atlas A” firstly flew in 1957 for only about 24 seconds before it blew up. The first successful flight of an Atlas missile took place in 1958. The first armed version of the Atlas (Atlas D) was declared operational in January 1959.

The R-7 and Atlas each required a large launch facility, making them vulnerable to attack, and could not be kept in a ready state. Failure rates were very high throughout the first of ICBM technology. The US was well behind the Soviet Union in the Space Race, so U.S. President John F. Kennedy increased the stakes with the Apollo program.

In the 1950s and 1960s, development began on Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems by both countries, only to be stopped by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT). The 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) treaty froze the number of ICBM launchers in both the U.S. and the USSR.

TIMELINE OF EVENTS

1946	US starts ICBM developement
1953	USSR starts development of the first ICBM
1972	SALT I takes place (USA-USSR)
1972	ABMT is signed
1972-1979	SALT II takes place (USA-USSR)
1987	MTCR is signed
1991	China pledges to adhere to the MTCR
2001 - 2002	HCOC is negotiated in Helsinki
June 2002	USA withdraws from ABMT
2002	Austria signs the HCOC
Nov. 2002	HCOC is adopted
Dec. 2004	UN GA adopts resolution 59/91 (HCOC)
June 2016	India joins the HCOC

COUNTRIES AND ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED

China

China developed a minimal independent nuclear deterrent right after its ideological split with the Soviet Union, in the early 1960s. After first testing a domestic built nuclear weapon in 1964, it went on to develop various warheads and missiles. These missiles are part of a broader military modernization used to enhance Beijing's ability to assert itself in regional and territorial matters. In July 2014, China announced the development of its newest generation of ICBM, capable of reaching the United States.

China has been developing missiles on the concept of 'no-first-use' (NFU), viewing its nuclear arsenal as a means of self-defense and deterrence. China's military modernization program and upgrades to its nuclear weapons arsenal, along with its 2013 defense white paper that did not follow China's NFU pledge, has led some to question China's commitment to its NFU policy. However, in its May 2015 defense white paper, Beijing reaffirmed its NFU policy stating that its nuclear weapons are for defense purposes only.

Israel

Israel's national defense regime against missiles, using their anti-ballistic missile system(named Arrow missile system), is the first operational missile defense system specifically designed and built to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles. Initially funded and produced by both Israel and the United States, the system development began in 1986 and has continued ever since.

Apart from Arrow missile, Israel has developed a system (named Iron dome) created to intercept and destroy rockets from distances of 4 to 70 kilometers away. Israel is also believed to have deployed a road mobile nuclear ICBM, which entered service in 2008.

Syria

Syria has one of the largest ballistic missile arsenals in the Middle East and is an active proliferator of ballistic missile technology. Syria has imported nearly all of its missile technology from a variety of nations (Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran), but is also capable of producing and maintaining it sustains a limited capacity to domestically produce and maintain its SRBM arsenal.

Its current civil war has forced the nation's government to freeze progress of its ballistic missile program. However, it has also increased the risk of use of ballistic missile by non-state actors, as many of Syria's ballistic missiles have fallen into the hands of non-state actors operating in the country.

Pakistan

In 1987 the Pakistan Ministry of Defense began conducting the "Missile Research and Development Program" for the comprehensive research and the development of guided missiles, as a response to a similar program existing in India. The program focused on developing the short to medium range missiles with a proper computer guidance system and no chemical weapons were involved.

Over the past 30 years Pakistan has developed a substantial and sophisticated missile arsenal, including a number of MRBMs and SRBMs. The tense relations between India and Pakistan led to greater proliferation in the 90's and it is now believed that Pakistan has up to 100 nuclear weapons in its stockpile.

India

India is the fourth country that adopted the anti-ballistic missile defense program as a means of self-defense, mainly because of the ballistic missile threat from Pakistan. The Indian Army is also capable of carrying nuclear weapons via sea-based or land-based ballistic missiles. In 2012, India successfully test fired its first ICBM, with a strike range of more than 5,000 km.

North Korea

North Korea has developed a national security strategy based on weapons of mass destruction, thus it has invested heavily in the development of ballistic missiles and the use of nuclear weapons. Its own missile program began with Scuds (a series of tactical ballistic missiles developed by the USSR during the Cold War) in 1976 and by 1984 it was building its own versions called Hwasongs, which have an estimated maximum range of about 1,000km and carry conventional, chemical and possibly biological weapons. North Korea is deeply reliant on these capabilities to hold US, allied forces, and civilian areas at risk.

Another development came in August 2016 when North Korea announced it had tested a submarine based "surface-to-surface MRBM". North Korea has also tested for the first time an ICBM (Hwasong-14) in July 2017.

Russia

Following the USSR nuclear arsenal, Russia deploys the largest nuclear missile force in the world. Reports indicate that Russia plans to spend 25% of its $560 billion budget for military modernization on upgrading its oldest missiles. The Russian nuclear arsenal received 50 new ICBM's in 2015 according to the Russian President and in 2015 Russia was estimated to have 499 strategic launchers with about 1900 nuclear warheads, carried by ICBMs and SRBMs. Russia also deploys a large arsenal of non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons, which can be delivered by SRBMs and can be potentially deployed to attack NATO forces.

In 1962-63, the Soviet Union began constructing the world's first ABM system around Moscow. Moscow deploys the A-135 anti-ballistic missile system to counter enemy missiles targeting the city or its surrounding areas, which became operational in 1995. The system was designed to stop an attack by only six to eight ICBMs, a satisfying number given the 1959 standards, which turned out to be essentially useless by the 1970's, when ICBM forces had reached massive levels. Yet, Moscow's missiles have reportedly proliferated around the globe and, in recent years, the Russian public and press have been critical of the deployment of nuclear arms so close to the capital.

USA

In 2002, USA deployed the National missile defense (NMD), an ABM program, which includes a number of anti-ballistic missiles and sea-based and space-based missile systems and is designed to counter a relatively small ICBM attack from a less sophisticated adversary. In 2002 the NMB destroyed a mock warhead 225 km above the Pacific and in 2005 it tracked and destroyed three a mock ballistic missile with success. In April 2013, the Pentagon deployed 14 missile interceptors to Guam (western Pacific Ocean) as a response to the North Korean threats to deliver nuclear weapons to the USA.

Since 2002, the US has been in talks with Europe over the possibility of setting up a European base to intercept LRBM, in order to help protect the US and Europe from possible missile threats from the Middle East or North Africa. In 2007 Russia threatened to place SRBMs on the Russia's border with NATO if the United States deployed 10 interceptor

missiles and on 2007, Putin warned of a new Cold War if the Americans deployed the shield in Central Europe.

UN

The link between the UN and the HCOC (which was negotiated outside the context of the United Nations), is established with the Resolutions regarding the HCOC that were adopted during the 59th, 60th, 63th, 65th, 67th and the 69th UN-General Assemblies in New York. In the 59th session, resolution 59/91 passed in the GA and formalised the support of the UN towards the HCOC.

USEFUL LINKS

- https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_01-02/icoc_janfeb03
- http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/
- http://www.hcoc.at/
- http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/missile-defense/history-of-russian-missile-defense.html#.WWsgHYSGPcc
- http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17399847
- https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/92fed.pdf
- https://www.nonproliferation.eu/
- http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/hague-code-conduct-against-ballistic-missile-proliferation-hcoc/
- https://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/101466.htm
- https://www.frstrategie.org/publications/autres/web/documents/2016/2016-maitre-iss-hcoc.pdf
- http://www.hcoc.at/documents/un5991-en.pdf